In the Lenin’s telegram to Orjonikidze sent on April 18, 1921 we read: “I ask you to remember that the internal and international situation of Georgia demands from the Georgian Communists, not the application of the Russian pattern, but the skillful and flexible creation of a distinctive tactic based on the greatest compliance with all kinds of petty-bourgeois elements.”[32]

The establishment of Bolshevik power in Georgia was rooted in several paradigms. On one hand, there were the general principles of “Leninism” and a willingness to grant more autonomy to the Soviet Republics. On the other hand, the approach of Stalin and Orjonikidze aimed at more centralized control from Moscow. These two approaches contradicted each other. Lenin's positions found allies among local Georgian Communists, but their struggle soon became meaningless due to Lenin's serious illness and eventual death. Subsequently, Stalin and his supporters gained power in the Kremlin, and a significant portion of the “old Bolsheviks” subsequently fell victim to Stalin's terror.

As R.G. Suny mentions: “The Sovietization of Transcaucasia was not the result of the simple application of Marxist principles, nor their cynical abandonment at an inconvenient juncture. Rather it was a product of conflict between ideological considerations and realistic assessments, between the strategic requirements of Soviet Russia and the aims of local Communists.”[33]

On February 16, the Georgian revolutionary committee (Revkom) was formed in the township of Shulaveri. The chairman of the Revkom became Philipe Makharadze.[34] His task, as laid out by Lenin, was to secure a broad base of support for Soviet power, beginning with the intelligentsia. This precluded an assault on Georgian national institutions, the extirpation by force of Menshevik influence, or any hint that Georgian sovereignty was to be compromised by Soviet Russia and its agents.[35] Like Philipe Makharadze, other influential “old Bolsheviks” came to the reins of governing Georgia: Budu Mdivani, Mamia Orakhelashvili[36], Mikha Tskhakaya and others. People who were well acquainted with local vicissitudes and had a say in the international Bolshevik movement.

The decision to unify the Transcaucasian republics was made prior to the occupation of the independent countries in Transcaucasia. During the meeting of Kavkraikom (the Caucasian Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party), convened on May 27-28, 1919, and chaired by Orjonikidze, there was persuasion regarding the necessity of unification of independent republics for Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Members of the Kavkraikom based in Tiflis disagreed, however, Orjonikidze informed the delegates of the decision to prepare an armed uprising in the region, which necessitated the adoption of this tactic. The conference acknowledged the necessity of close unity among the Transcaucasian republics with the RSFSR in military, economic, and foreign policies.[37] The decision on the unification of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics was officially approved by the resolution of the Baku Council, based on the reports[38] of Kirov[39] and Orjonikidze. This process unfolded gradually, involving the merging of railway systems, the creation of a single institution of foreign trade (Obvneshtorg), and the dismantling of border checkpoints among other measures.[40] On December 30, 1922, the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) entered the USSR as a full member alongside the Russian (RSFSR), Ukrainian (USSR), and Belorussian (BSSR) Soviet Socialist Republics.[41]

It is worth noting that all these decisions were made from top to bottom through the Kavbiuro[42] which, on the one hand, caused irritation among the de facto Bolshevik rulers present. On the other hand, they were aware of their unpopularity within the country.

The degree of independence lost by the Georgian SSR and internal party struggles were also reflected in the legislative space. As Stephen Jones points out: “[The] concern with “Russian imperialism” became a major concern within the Georgian party and the ratification of the ZSFSR treaty in December 1922, which deprived Georgia of a number of vital sovereign rights (notably the Leninist right to secede), signaled a victory for the centralizers. Other “Russification” measures which caused bitter disputes inside and outside the party included the loss of a separate Georgian Red Army and currency in 1922, and the constitutional and legislative models laid down by the RSFSR. Despite Lenin's constant warnings against “template” or “thoughtless imitation” of the Russian experience, the Georgian government created identical institutions and adopted civil and criminal codes and a constitution closely modelled on the RSFSR.”[43]

On February 26, 1921, by order No. 2 of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia, an extraordinary commission was created, marking the establishment of the first state security body after Sovietization. On August 20, 1926, the State Political Department of the Georgian SSR was established within the NKVD, and it was soon placed under the leadership of Georgian Bolshevik and Soviet Politician, Lavrentiy Beria (November 28, 1926 - October 13, 1931).[44] Subsequently, the agency underwent several transformations, merging with the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Ultimately, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security of the USSR were united, with Beria appointed as the minister in 1938.

After Stalin's death, fundamental changes took place. The State Security Committee (KGB) was created under the Central Committee of the Communist Party (ЦК КПСС). Accordingly, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR dated April 10, 1954, the KGB was also established in the Georgian SSR.

It is worth noting that in the first decade of the Soviet Union, according to the central apparatus of the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) on December 1, 1929, the Secret Department consisted of eight departments, one of which was the seventh — identification, struggle, and monitoring of activities of Transcaucasian national parties, Georgian Mensheviks, and others.[45] This elucidates the substantial sway held by members of the exiled government overseas and the extent to which the were regarded with apprehension by the security apparatus in the Kremlin.

As for the opposition in the 1920s, the remaining members of the previous Menshevik government in Georgia were either immediately subjected to repressions and locked up in prisons, deported, or moved to the side of the Bolsheviks or left politics altogether. In 1923, at a meeting of delegates gathered under great pressure from the Bolsheviks, the party announced its self-liquidation.[46]

At the first stage of the Sovietization of Georgia, opposing groups formed within the Bolshevik Party itself, aligning with different courses. The largest groups were the “Philippists”, supporters of Philipe Makharadze, and the “Budists”, supporters of Budu Mdivani. There were also smaller groups. However, after Lenin's death and the consolidation of Stalin's rule, the conflict between these groups was suppressed, and there was no longer room for internal opposition.[47] This continued throughout the period of the Soviet Union, until the end of the 1970s when groups of dissidents emerged, laying the foundation for the creation of political unions and even taking over the state reins in process of the restoration of Georgian independence from the Soviet Union.

The Sovietization of independent Georgia began in February 1921 and concluded in March. The first investigative case, which is preserved in the archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (formerly the archive of the Ministry of Security of the Georgian SSR), is the case of the Mirianashvili brothers. On March 22, the Georgian Revkom issued an order to prevent speculation, and on March 27, inspection of trading facilities began. According to the investigation, specific products were discovered in the basement of the Mirianashvili family: 35 boxes of salt, 12 boxes of ham, 7 boxes of cheese, etc. Despite the assertion that it was a supply intended for the family and that the family was no longer trading, 52-year-old Razhden Mirianashvili was executed.[48]

The 1920s were marked by several waves of repression, notable among them the execution of a military center in 1923 and a large-scale repressive campaign against the participants of the 1924 uprising, which we discussed in previous chapters.

The peak of political repressions carried out in 1937-1938, known as the "Stalin Terror" or "Great Purge", are one of the largest atrocities in the history of the 20th century, when the Soviet state carried out mass executions and deportations of its own citizens.

On July 30, 1937, Order No. 0047 on operation to repress former kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements) was signed by Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD from 1936 to 1938 and approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.[49] At the beginning of the operation, Georgia was allocated a limit of 5,000 people according to the first (execution) and second (deportation) categories. By the end of the year, due to the submission of additional limits, more than 15,000 people were repressed.[50]

Soviet terror was divided into operations, and the total number of repressed persons in Georgia was determined as a result of quantitative analysis:

In total, about 0.75% of the total population of the Georgian SSR was repressed. If we consider the repressed category of men between the ages of 20-69, whose number constituted more than 90% of the repressed, we find that 2.3% of the population in this category was repressed.[52]

Among those repressed were 583 women, among them 163 were tried and sentenced to be executed under the first category, 420 to be deported under the second category.

During the period known as the "Great Purge," the implementation of trials conducted according to the so-called "Stalin's lists" assumed a conspicuous role, primarily targeting urban residents, including members of the intelligentsia, high-ranking officials, military personnel, and clergy. Unlike other operations, a significant proportion of individuals faced the severest penalty: execution by firing squad. In aggregate, more than 3,600 individuals underwent trial in Georgia pursuant to Stalin's lists, with over 3,100 of them receiving death sentences.[53]

The history of trials by lists in Georgia is notable. The Military Collegium, tasked with overseeing the trial proceedings associated with Stalin's lists across the Soviet Union, visited Georgia on only two occasions—in June-July and September-October 1937. During these intervals, it deliberated on 910 cases. In a letter to Stalin on October 30, 1937, Beria wrote that “over the past year, the NKVD of Georgia arrested more than 12,000 people, and the pace of trials was lagging behind. In this regard, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia requested permission to present the cases of the participants of the Trotskyist terrorist subversive-espionage organization and the participants of the right-wing terrorist-subversive espionage organization exposed by the NKVD of the Georgian SSR to the “Special Troika” created according to the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”.[54] 

On November 14, Beria raised the issue more specifically, requesting that the list of 439 people, whose cases were intended for deliberation by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, be reviewed by the Troika. This marked the seventh list sent from Georgia for approval. On November 22, 1937, the list was accompanied by the signatures of Stalin, Molotov, and Zhdanov, indicating Stalin's agreement to Beria's proposal. On November 25, 1937, Yezhov's decree, issued in the name of the People‘s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR Sergo Goglidze, stated: “Commence with your personal chairmanship, with the obligatory participation of the prosecutor, the trial through the local Troika, which will concern the 439 cases specified in the list presented on November 14 with No. 77487. Conduct the trial in a separate session, without mixing it with the kulak operation cases. Immediately after the execution of the sentence, send all the cases to Moscow, attaching to each case an extract from the protocol of the meeting of the Troika. Yezhov.”[55]

This condition, where the lists intended for the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR were sent to the Troika, persisted in the case of Georgia in the future, and the judicial function was fully integrated by the Troika of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs until the end of the repressions.

After 1938, when Beria was appointed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the number of repressions decreased throughout the USSR, including in Georgia. After the end of the Second World War, many soldiers who were captured in the fight against Nazi Germany were sent with their families to the so-called “filtration camps”. The exact number of such people is not known, although they returned to their homes soon after Stalin's death in 1953.[56]

During the so-called Khrushchev “thaw” period, there was a rethinking and public condemnation of repressions, which many historians consider an attempt by Khrushchev personally and other top officials of the Politburo to wash away the blood on their hands. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev read a secret report titled “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences”, dedicating a large part to discussing repressions. In the following years, political repressions took on different forms, and their scale decreased, although various practices, such as the use of repressive psychiatry, also occurred in Georgia.[57]

In 1970s, Eduard Shevardnadze emerged as the main figure in the country's politics, quickly advancing up the career ladder to become a young, energetic leader.[58] Before his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, he served as the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party from 1972 to 1985. Shevardnadze emphasized how to maneuver between the needs of the republic and restrictive rules and directives from the center. State policy toward Georgian nationalism combined dialogue with the full force of police repression. However, in 1978, controversy and mass protests erupted over the removal of the constitutional clause that declared Georgian the official language of the republic. Shevardnadze intervened directly with Brezhnev and convinced top leaders not to remove the article. He also chose dialogue with Abkhaz protestors demanding secession from Georgia and a merger with Russia.[59]

Since the 1970s, individuals with different opinions from intellectual circles, so-called dissidents, became victims of political repression. In 1977, Merab Kostava[60] and Zviad Gamsakhurdia,[61] two prominent leaders who raised political issues, were immediately repressed. Gamsakhurdia, the son of the prominent Georgian-Soviet writer Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, decided to recant his views on television to receive a pardon.[62] In the prison camps of the Soviet Union, mainly in Perm-35 and Perm-36,[63] there were number of activists who were released together with Kostava and became the most prominent members of the Georgian national-liberation movement in the late 1980s.

One of the last large-scale punitive actions carried out by the Soviet Union in Georgia was the April 9, 1989 tragedy, also known as the Massacre of Tbilisi. The events unfolded when an anti-Soviet, pro-independence demonstration was brutally suppressed by the Soviet Army, resulting in 21 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The protests in Tbilisi began on April 4, 1989 following the so-called Lykhny Assembly on March 18, 1989, where several thousand Abkhazians demanded secession from Georgia and the restoration of the union republic status of 1921–1931. On April 9, at 3:45 a.m., Soviet APCs and troops under Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, General Igor Rodionov surrounded the demonstration area. Later, Rodionov claimed in an interview that groups of Georgian militants attacked unarmed soldiers with stones, metal chains, and rods. The Soviet troops received an order from General Rodionov to disband and clear the avenue of demonstrators by any means necessary. Sharpened shovels and chemical substances were used against the demonstrators. It is worth noting that Anatoly Sobchak's[64] parliamentary commission on the investigation of the events of April 9, 1989, presented a valid conclusion: Groups of Soviet soldiers were reported to chase individual victims, rather than dispersing the crowd, using gas and other prohibited methods that caused the protestors’ deaths.[65]

On March 31, 1991, Georgians voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum. With a 90.5% turnout, approximately 99% voted in favor of independence. On April 9, the second anniversary of the tragedy, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia proclaimed sovereignty and independence from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1991 and the date became the Day of National Unity.

After World War I, politicians who represented the various entities discussed in the first part of this paper adopted a pro-German orientation from the very beginning. They declared Georgia's independence on May 26, 1918, with the assistance of Germany. In the same year, General Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff, noted the importance of Georgia in the process of subordinating the entire Caucasus as a sphere of influence: "If Germany establishes itself in Georgia, creates an effective German army there, and demonstrates its intent to strengthen its interests in the Caucasus, new Caucasian states will gradually join Georgia... The creation of the Caucasian bloc will play an important role for Germany both during the war, by providing raw materials and an effective military force, and after it". Ludendorff’s letter also offered insight into Germany’s far-reaching plans for economic activity in the Caucasus. He continued: "The neutralization of the Caucasus will create a wide field for trade and economic relations for Europe, and especially for Germany..."[66]  Indeed, the government of the First Republic of Georgia actively worked with “Siemens”, “Nobel”, and other Western mega-corporations, as well as European states, to expand their business in Georgia. This was expected to influence the country's international support, recognition, and ultimately ensure security.

On April 5, 1921 the Georgian Revkom nationalized all land in Georgia and prohibited all sale, purchase and renting of land. Estates and large holdings of the former government, nobility and church were confiscated and placed in the state land fund. The poorest peasants were to be given land from this fund, and surveyors were mobilized to help carry out land adjustments. A single tax replaced many taxes and the poorest peasants, collective farmers and the Red Army members were exempted from it.[67]

The Atlas of the Soviet Socialist Republics, published in 1928, speaks of Georgia's economic capabilities. “As a mountainous country, Transcaucasia has numerous ore deposits, with copper and manganese deserving serious attention. The famous Chiatura manganese deposit, of global importance, is located in Georgia, with estimated market ore reserves of 70-80 million tons. Before the war, Chiatura manganese occupied the first place in the world market in the extraction and export of ore. During the Civil War, mining almost ceased, and restoration began in 1923/24. Since 1925, it has been the subject of the Harriman concession. The urban population ratio in Georgia is 22.3%. Transcaucasia produces about ⅓ of all yellow tobacco production in the USSR. Within Transcaucasia, tobacco growing is mainly carried out in Georgia, which accounted for 92% of the sown area in 1926, including 77% in Abkhazia”.[68]

Georgia also held a large share in the production of citrus fruits, tea, and mineral waters throughout the Soviet Union, which remained until the Soviet Union's collapse. Transit roads have added to the economic importance of Georgia historically as well as in modern times. Especially the railway and the Baku-Batumi pipeline, through which Baku's oil was exported through the Black Sea.

As we learn from the atlas published in 1928, in 1925, the Averell Harriman[69] Corporation also owned a concession in the country. This is not surprising, as the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union during this period allowed for the involvement of foreign capital. Georgia had reached a stable economic and cultural plateau by the mid-1920s. The economic revival was palpable in both agriculture and industry by 1925-1926, with agricultural output reaching 94.4% of the prewar period (1913).[70]

In 1928, Stalin's Great Turn changed the NEP in favor of accelerating collectivization and industrialization, and Georgia was no exception in this respect. As a result of collectivization, resources from agriculture were maximized, enabling accelerated industrialization at the expense of exporting agricultural products. These processes, however, occurred against the backdrop of mass hunger in the country. Collectivization and the suppression of the kulaks were reasons for the failure to achieve efficient production and a decent standard of living for workers in Soviet agriculture in the later stages of its development.[71]

After the Second World War, the Soviet and Georgian economies began to recover slowly. In 1963, all this was compounded by an extremely low wheat harvest, due to which the Soviet Union bought 12 million tons of wheat, spending almost all of its foreign exchange and gold reserves.[72]

Since the 1970s and the “stagnation” period, the share of the shadow economy had increased in Georgia. In an article published in 1983, the authors explained this as a special cultural phenomenon in Georgia, estimating the “second” or shadow economy of Georgia at over 25% of the republic's GNP.[73] The article also reviewed the aspects of cultural work in the Georgian SSR and offered a table that accurately reflects the mentioned phenomenon. Unfortunately, a similar style of labor and economic relations was maintained in Georgia for many years even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

According to prevailing theses presented in contemporary Russian propaganda media, which are also addressed in academic discourse and tabloid yellow press, it is posited that during the Soviet era, Georgian economics thrived at the detriment of other republics, notably Russia. Consequently, the average consumption level in Georgia surpassed that of the union's average by several multiples. However, in 1990, the national income produced per capita in Georgia was only 79.1% of the similar average indicator of the union, lagging behind the leader Estonia by 47.2%. During the Soviet period, Georgia was neither a privileged republic nor one at the mercy of the center. The scales of its production and consumption corresponded as closely as possible, with the corresponding indicators per capita about 4:1 behind the all-union indicators.[74]

The Soviet Union subsumed heterogeneous nations on its vast territory, and from the very beginning, the regime aspired to incorporate all of these peoples into one politically unified people. In the 1920s, the policy of Korenizatsiya was implemented, which meant the purposeful development of local, non-Russian ethnicities. This policy brought Georgians into governmental institutions. By the mid-1920s, almost all-important posts in the republic were held by Georgians.[75]

At least as important as the economic recovery for the stabilization of Soviet rule in Georgia were the measures undertaken to promote ethnic Georgian culture — building schools, promoting publications in Georgian, and encouraging various fields of art. The 1920s was a period of rival literary schools: “proletarian writers” who unequivocally supported the Soviet government, literary figures willing to work with the Bolsheviks, those who were either quietly hostile or apolitical, and the symbolist poets. Party policy encouraged competition among writers and artists and denied official recognition to any particular group.[76]

In the early 1930s, the Communist Party modified thе Korenizatsiya policy and would later carry out repressions against its active supporters. Korenizatsiya changed into a policy emphasizing Russification based on the principle of “Friendship of the Peoples,” which also affected the educational sphere. This meant that the Soviet regime supported the development of ethno-nationalist sentiments among the titular nations in the union republics[77], while at the same time considering Russian nationalism and culture as the first among equals.[78]

Thus, simultaneously Russia was considered superior, but the leader, Stalin, was from the peripheral Caucasus, while his fellow-countrymen and the other Caucasians were being actively promoted. As Lavrenty Beria’s son Sergo recalled in his memoirs, it was his father who first provided Stalin with the idea of holding ten-day celebrations (Decades/Декады) of the cultures of each Soviet republic in Moscow to show the positive influence of Soviet Russia on these cultures. According to Sergo Gegechkori (Beria), Stalin liked this idea and represented it as his own.[79] It is impossible to prove whether this was truly Beria’s initiative solely based on these memoirs, but it is a fact that from 1936 such decades were regularly held in Moscow. In 1937, a Georgian Dekada was held after those for the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs. Among the cultural activities included were not only traditional aspects and folklore, but also performances of “high” culture such as ballet and opera.[80]

The 1937 Dekada helped shape the general attitude in the Soviet Union toward the Georgians and Georgia: first of all, in included the epithet of “Sunny Georgia” which is still associated with it in Russian-speaking countries. According to the newspaper Pravda and other reviews in the press, it was the warm weather and sun that determined the joyful nature of the culture of the Georgian people. During the Dekada phrases such as “Great nation and culture” and “thousand-year-old history” were used abundantly by the media.[81] However, even Russian authors of that time observed that the Russian elites patronizingly considered the national cultures of the republics to be “something exotic”.[82]

The ordinary Soviet stories, seemingly harmless at first sight, also speak to the “sunny” image of the Georgians formed in the 1930s: for instance, the Kansas University professor Eric R. Scott, in his article “Soccer Artistry and the Secret Police: Georgian Football in the Multiethnic Soviet Empire,” describes a meeting of the USSR Football Federation in 1970 at which its head, Valentin Granatkin, irritated by the boasting of the Georgian delegate Tsomaia, interrupted by exclaiming “Only because you have no winter!”.[83] Scott also authored the book Familiar Strangers: The Georgian Diaspora and the Evolution of Soviet Empire, in which he describes the influence of the Georgian feasting tradition (supra) on the whole Soviet Union, which became a part of the traditional culture of Central Asia and elsewhere.

After Stalin’s death and Beria’s execution in 1953, the attitude of the center toward “sunny” Georgia and its people began to change. The accumulating covert jealousy openly erupted in February 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when during his “Secret Speech” Khrushchev not only emphasized the crimes committed by Stalin personally, but also linked them to his ethnic Georgian origins.[84]

Rumors about the contents of Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” quickly began to spread in Tbilisi, resulting in the tragic events of March 1956: public protests were held to defend the name of Stalin, during which there was a noticeable intensification of nationalist sentiments and sloganeering. The demonstrations were ultimately crushed violently by the Soviet security forces. It is noteworthy that calls for national independence and the first underground nationalist dissident movements began in Georgia right after the 1956 events.[85]

Georgians’ anger at Khrushchev’s destalinization can also be explained by the argument that, either consciously or unconsciously, Georgians perceived the attack on Stalin as an attack on Georgia. Khrushchev’s attempt to diminish the role of Georgia in the hierarchy of the Soviet republics was evident, although whether Georgia had a privileged status under Stalin and Beria is a contentious topic even today among historians. It should also be noted here that Khrushchev had his own clients in Georgia, such as the new First Secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia, Vasil Mzhavanadze (1902-1988), and the head of the Georgian KGB Aleksi Inauri (1908-1993). Nevertheless, Khrushchev understood well that Georgians would never forgive him for the attack on Stalin, Georgia and the Georgians.[86]

Following the 1956 events and the demonstration of raw power by the regime, the attitudes toward Georgians gradually settled. According to various oral histories, Khrushchev several times threatened Georgians with strict measures and deportations, although there is no documentary evidence for this. Through First Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR: Through the diplomatic acumen of figures such as Vasil Mzhavanadze (who held office from 1953 to 1972) and Eduard Shevardnadze (1972-1985), coupled with the broader context of the Brezhnev Era of Stagnation, Georgians assumed a distinct role within the Soviet commonwealth. This role predominantly centered around cultural expressions, such as hospitality, cuisine, singing, dancing, and the tradition of delivering elaborate toasts led by a tamada, or toastmaster. Yet there remained the demands of empire: the ephemeral “love and respect” towards Georgia and its culture was (and still is) in place only until such time as it interfered with the “comfort zone” of the Russian Empire, and the Georgians aspired to break out of their designated role.

Georgian cinematography frequently achieved success throughout the Soviet Union and beyond. However, the film "Repentance" (Georgian: მონანიება / Monanieba) by Tengiz Abuladze[87] became a true breakthrough and a political manifesto. The film was produced in 1984, however, it was banned from release in the Soviet Union for its semi-allegorical critique of Stalinism. When the film was finished in 1984 it was screened once and then shelved for three years. In 1987, with the new political climate initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the film was released again all over the Soviet Union and at film festivals in Western countries. Abuladze was awarded the Order of Lenin and he accompanied Gorbachev on his first official visit to New York in 1988. “I made the film so that this would never happen again.” - with those words, spoken in firm but unemotional tones, the Soviet film director Tengiz Abuladze explained the genesis of ''Repentance,'' the first Soviet film ever to give a sweeping and frank portrayal of the madness that gripped the country during the purges of Stalin.[88]

After the period of independence, the Soviet elite maintained quite solid political, economic and cultural positions, and even today, after 32 years of independence, it remains challenging for the country to free itself from their influence and create a new, independent Georgian elite. It is often said that remnants of the Soviet elite and their descendants still hold sway. The country has struggled to establish a real meritocratic system. One significant problem is the absence of an effective law on lustration, which is often the subject of debate in the country, although no effective law has been adopted yet. To justify this, government representatives and parliamentarians often cite the impossibility of lustration, as, officially, 80% of the archival material of the KGB was destroyed during the Georgian Civil War of 1991-1993.[89]

Georgians used to make military careers in the Russian Empire and a number of officers reached the highest ranks. The officers who served in the Russian Empire in the early 1900’s formed the core of the National Army of the First Republic of Georgia. As an example, General Giorgi Kvinitadze (1874-1970), renowned as the final commander-in-chief who helmed the army of the First Republic during the Russian-Georgian war of 1921, notably contributed to both the Russo-Japanese conflict and the First World War. However, it should be noted that in the First Republic of Georgia, a second, one might say parallel army, was created in the form of the National Guard. This was due to the distrust of the political leadership of the First Republic towards the former high-ranking military officers of the Russian Empire. This factor naturally caused antagonism and tension. General Mazniashvili (1871-1937) of the National Army mentioned in his memoirs written in late 1920s’ that the army was “treated like a son-in-law, while the Guards were treated like a son.”[90]

The Bolsheviks were even more distrustful. Among the officers of the Red Army, former members of the army of Tsarist Russia or independent Georgia were rarely encountered; instead, there were mostly former revolutionaries and party workers with low military education but high loyalty to the party. Such a contingent was ready to perform any task “from above”. Additionally, Stalin's terror killed tens of thousands of experienced soldiers in 1937-1938. In the end, for example, in some operations of the Second World War, the casualty ratio between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was as high as 10:1.[91]

In 1921, the 11th Army of the Red Army played a crucial role in the Sovietization of Georgia. The local Red Army was created on the base of the occupiers. From 1918 to 1934, the supreme military authority of Bolshevik Russia and the newly founded Soviet country was the Revolutionary War Council. Shalva Eliava (1883-1937) joined it as a representative of Georgia from the end of August 1923, and from March 5, 1924, Sergo Orjonikidze joined as a representative of the North Caucasus.

According to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1918-1925, Leon Trotsky, the chief architect of the Soviet country's army: “The Red Army should not have been colonial like in the pre-revolutionary era. Because of this, they should have studied the local population more, imbued with the ideas of brotherhood and unity. The Great Russian proletariat had to do everything in its power to help backward national elements that would make a thoughtful, independent decision to build the Red Army, so that they could finally defend themselves with their own strength”. It seems that Georgia did not fit into Trotsky's general vision in this regard, as military affairs in Georgia were not truly backward, and the Red Army couldn't shake off the label of the occupier.

In 1935, on the basis of the Red Banner Caucasus Army the Transcaucasian Military District was formed. The Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani national formations, plus units from the 11th Army of the Red Army, all joined the new district about this time. In 1935–1992, all 22 Commanders of the Transcaucasian Military District were ethnically non-Georgian (predominantly Russian). 

In Soviet Georgia during the late era, as well as throughout the Soviet era, military personnel found themselves in a privileged position. However, this was preceded by several stages of purges: in 1921, many professional soldiers left Georgia with the government of the First Republic of Georgia, and the execution of the military center in 1923 was the first purge of anti-Soviet soldiers and a warning to others. Additionally, during the Second World War, the Republic of Georgia incurred significant casualties, particularly among its professional soldiers. Those who survived these defeats became an important tool in the hands of Soviet propaganda until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The commemoration of the soldiers who died in the war continued almost until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Honored veterans of the war remembered and told stories of the “Great Patriotic War”, as the 1941-1945 period of World War II was called in the Soviet Union, for more than four decades, fully consistent with the Soviet heroic narrative: unconditional and single-handed victory, ingenious decisions of military generals and political leadership, and the heroic face and dedication of the fallen. Of course, all this was supported by Soviet cinematography, literature, music, paintings, and other branches of art, which gave birth to many propaganda works in the post-war period. The author of this article, born in 1987, vividly recalls his childhood experiences in the 1990s, wherein he frequently heard narratives about the "Great Patriotic War" from his grandfather, who actively participated in the War, as well as stories about his brothers and fellow villagers who perished during the war. Within the family album, remnants of these memories endure, with photographs depicting schoolchildren visiting their ancestral home in a village near Kutaisi, engaging in conversations with their grandfather, who perennially adorned himself in a suit bedecked with medals. Regrettably, the author only became acquainted with significant historical events such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin’s terror, the Katyn massacre of Polish officers, and the utilization of the military as "cannon fodder" subsequent to the passing of his grandfather.

The primary role of the district encompassed the management of military affairs within the South Caucasus republics and the supervision of the southern borders, notably the pivotal 273-kilometer border between Turkey and the Georgian SSR, representing the sole juncture where a NATO member state and the USSR shared a border. However, alongside this principal function, the military formations earned notoriety for their harsh repression of local protests. This was evident during the demonstrations of March 5-9, 1956, and April 9, 1989, wherein the army assumed a punitive role against protesting youths, resulting in the loss of over 20 lives in both instances.

While the Party leaders' reliance on and need of the military increased in the post-Stalinist period, so did their concern with a military that was moving from a submissive, fully dependent position under Stalin, to a more assertive relationship under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. This profound concern was expressed by Khrushchev, who stated, “Who in our country is in a position to intimidate the leadership? It is the military… the military is prone to temptations; it is prone to indulge in irresponsible daydreaming and bragging. Given a chance, some elements within the military might try to force a militarist policy on the government. Therefore, the government must always keep a bit between the teeth of the military.”[93]

Nonetheless, in the final analysis, the evolving party-military relationship was not only one of conflict, but also one of cooperation. The relationship consisted of an ongoing institutional dialogue between the party and the military—a dialogue between partners in a common enterprise, not one between enemies. The military showed itself over the decades to be a most loyal, reliable, and conservative institution under the Party's leadership. The Party's attitude and policy toward the military, therefore, were the result of a delicate balance between two conflicting motivations: the desire for hegemony within the state, and the need to maintain a strong military political posture before the rest of the world.[94]

Following the attainment of national independence, Russian military units continued to maintain a presence in the Caucasus countries for several years. It is noteworthy that one of the most strategically significant bases, situated in Akhalkalaki, served as a remote outpost against the Nato-member Turkey. Remarkably, this base persisted as the final Russian military installation to withdraw from Georgia, a process completed in 2007.

In 2023, the Russian military maintains a significant presence in the Caucasus, specifically in the occupied territories of Georgia, including the Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia, recognized as independent states following the 2008 invasion and war by the Russian Federation. The Tskhinvali Region, in particular, maintains large economic and political ties with the Russian military bases. Strategically positioned a mere 2 kilometers from the central highway linking Eastern and Western Georgia, and less than 40 kilometers from the capital, Tbilisi, these bases exert a profound influence on the region's dynamics. Furthermore, a base situated in Gyumri, Armenia, accommodates up to 3,000 soldiers, and "peacekeeping" forces are stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. These deployments serve as a means for Russia to assert its geopolitical and geostrategic objectives vis-à-vis the Western powers.

Anton Vatcharadze is the Head of the Memory and Disinformation Direction at the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI). He holds both a Bachelor's and a Master's degree from Tbilisi State University and has authored numerous articles on history and memory. Vatcharadze also facilitates humanitarian studies and potential student awareness at the University of Georgia (UG).